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Abstract
This paper introduces a new approach to ‘cultural transmission of
preferences’ (see Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001). It is based on the con-
ceptualization of the culture of a person as a set of cultural values and
attitudes, represented as an n–dimensional tuple in Euclidean space.
The culture of a person is formed through social learning and imitation
from role–models, which correspond to the chosen ‘displayed cultures’
of parents (‘vertical transmission’) and the society at large (‘oblique
transmission’). Parents might choose a ‘displayed culture’ that does
not coincide with their true culture, since they aim at countervailing
negative cultural influences that their children are exposed to in the so-
ciety at large. Additionally, they can invest into the success that their
displayed culture has in the socialization process of their children. We
will consider in the present paper an OLG model with two cultural
groups, and where in any period, the members of each of the cultural
groups have identical culture. We show that if parents have a desire
for cultural closeness to their children (e.g. ‘imperfect empathy’), then
they will always behave culturally more ‘radical’ relative to the culture
of the other cultural group. Furthermore, they will always invest into
their socialization success. Nevertheless, these investments are never
sufficient to let the distance between the future cultures of the children
of both cultural groups be larger or equal than the cultural distance of
the parental generation. As a consequence, the cultures of both groups
converge to a homogeneous steady state culture, which can be inter-
preted as a mixture of the two initial cultures. This result corresponds
to the ‘melting pot’ theory of integration of cultural groups.
Keywords: Cultural transmission; Socialization
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the question of successful integration of immigrants with
different cultural backgrounds into hosting societies has attained increas-
ing attention, both in media and on the political agenda. In Europe, the
focus of the debate has been on an alleged lack of integration among Mus-
lim immigrants, compared to other immigrant groups (compare e.g. Gallis
(2005)). This allegation has also been confirmed empirically, see e.g. Bisin
et al. (2007) who use a U.K. data–set and find significantly less and slower
integration of Muslims compared to non–Muslims. Compared to the Euro-
pean nation states, the debate in the U.S.A. has been less pronounced given
its historical pre–disposition as an immigrant country. Still influential is the
‘melting pot’ theory, which assumes that new immigrants will integrate into
the society, thereby contributing to the creation of a new cultural identity
(Han, 2006, p. 32). While this theory is based on, and successful to describe,
the experience of ‘old immigration’ from western and northern European im-
migrants (which are culturally close to anglo-saxian Americans), it fails to
explain the tendency towards cultural pluralism that the U.S. society has
experienced thereafter (Gordon, 1964, pp. 115–119, 132–136).
The aim of the present paper is to present a theoretical framework that
contributes to the understanding of the process of cultural assimilation (or
even dissimilation). Cultural assimilation is defined as a decrease in the
distance between the cultures of two persons or groups, underlying the con-
cept of culture as a set of values and attitudes1. The culture of a person
is formed in the youth through the socialization process, shaped by social
learning and imitation from role–models (displayed cultures) that the child
is confronted with in its social environment. Parents have an incentive to
actively engage in the socialization process, given that they want to coun-
tervail negative cultural influences that their children are exposed to. The
term ‘negative’ applies whenever the displayed culture of a person or group
does not coincide with the culture that the child should optimally adopt
from the parents’ point of view. What the parents perceive as the ‘optimal
culture’ depends on which specific socialization motivation structure is ap-
plied. We will consider in this paper the desire of the parents to keep the
(future) culture of their offspring close to their own culture.
The present analysis stands in a natural context to the existing litera-
ture on cultural transmission of preferences. This literature is based on the
work of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985)
in evolutionary anthropology. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) presented a
general framework to study the population dynamics of the distribution of
preference traits (cultures) under an endogenous intergenerational cultural
1Cultural assimilation in this context is hence a mutual concept in that it not just
presumes the integration of one group into the culture of another; cultural assimilation
can rather originate from just one, or both of the cultural groups under scrutiny.
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transmission mechanism. In this framework, which is now standard in the
literature, the endogeneity stems from the parental choice of socialization
intensity, which effectively determines the probability that the child will
directly adopt the culture of the parents. If this direct socialization does
not succeed, the child will randomly adopt the culture of an adult in the
social environment, the probabilities of which are determined by the distri-
bution of the cultural traits in the population. Given that parents perceive
a subjective utility loss if their children adopt another culture, the incen-
tives for actively engaging in the socialization process are increasing in the
population share of the other cultural group. This means that minorities do
socialize more intensely compared to majorities, which under certain condi-
tions prevents their culture from disappearance in the cultural equilibrium.
The properties of the model framework have been used in the analysis of
several different issues, such as e.g. preferences for social status (Bisin and
Verdier, 1998), voting and political ideology (Bisin and Verdier, 2000), cor-
ruption (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002), development and social capital, hold
up problems (Olcina and Penarrubia, 2004).
Nevertheless, the models in this strand of literature are based on inter–
temporarily fixed cultures, with the cultural distance between the cultural
groups left unspecified. As a consequence, the parental assessment of the
‘cultural threat’ that another group exerts on a child in the socialization
process has to be introduced as an exogenously fixed degree of ‘cultural
intolerance’ (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, p. 307). While as this framework
allows the analysis of the population dynamics of the distribution of the
fixed preferences (cultures), its construction makes it impossible to study
the evolutionary cultural change that results out of the social(ization) in-
teraction of cultural groups. Important issues, such as whether the cultures
living together will assimilate or dissimilate over time, must be left uncon-
sidered. Recently, Bisin et al. (2006) introduced parental identity–choice2
into the cultural transmission of preferences framework to study the assim-
ilation process of cultural minorities. Parents of the minority group can
choose among a continuum of ‘life–styles’, all of which represent different
degrees of assimilation to the social norm of the majority. A lack of assimi-
lation causes social costs that positively depend on the population share of
the majority group and negatively on the degree of ethnic identity (which
is a decision variable for the parents3). Nevertheless, the parental problem
of choosing the optimal level of assimilation and ethnic identity is separated
from the socialization problem (which is organized along the standard lines
of the cultural transmission of preferences literature). Although the assim-
2The concept of identity formation is based on the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
3Bisin et al. (2006) motivate the construction of ethnic identity as a psychological
mechanism that is rationally employed to reduce the psychological costs associated with
behaving in a non–assimilated way relative to the social norm of the majority cultural
group.
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ilation choice corresponds to a choice of ‘life–style’, hence a role–model or
displayed culture, this has no social–learning impact in the socialization
process of the child. Parents still (probabilistically) socialize the children to
the fixed cultural specification of the minority group, disregarding of their
generically different displayed culture. The dynamic evolution of the degree
of assimilation of the cultural minority then derives from the dynamics of
the population distribution of cultures and the evolution of the degree of
ethnic identity, which determines the parentally perceived utility cost of the
anticipated life–style of the child.
Compared to these latter models, the present paper introduces a number
of innovations. Most importantly, it drops the assumption of fixed cultures
and replaces the ‘cultural transmission (of preferences)’ framework with a
new conceptualization of the socialization process that endogenously deter-
mines the ‘formation of culture’. This approach is based on the specification
of the culture of a person or group as a set of cultural values and attitudes,
represented by a tuple in an n–dimensional Euclidean space. The cultural
distance between two persons or groups is then defined as the respective
Euclidean distance. The culture of a person is formed in its youth period
through the socialization process. As Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), we
impose the ‘tabula rasa’ assumption, i.e. children are born without a pre–
defined culture. Rather, culture results out of social learning and imitation
of role–models, with the precise specification depending on the relative time–
exposures to different ‘displayed cultures’ (viz. ‘role–models’ or ‘life–styles’)
in the social environment, and the relative intensities with which the persons
incorporating the role–models try to socialize the child. Formally, we also
view displayed cultures as tuples in an n–dimensional Euclidean space, and
the culture that a child adopts is then an n–tuple in the convex hull of the
displayed cultures.
The intuition behind this process is as follows. Assume that a child is
exposed to only two different persons in the socialization period. Assume
further that one of the persons represents a role–model, or displayed culture,
with a strong intensity of a specific cultural value (e.g. family values), and
the other person displays a weak intensity of this cultural value. Formally,
thus, the entries for this cultural value in the specifications of displayed
culture of the two persons take on a high, respectively low, (numerical)
value. At this point, we replace the standard assumption in the literature
on cultural transmission of preferences, i.e. that the child would be social-
ized to either of the two cultures that are represented by the role–models
in the social environment, with an alternative approach: Children socially
learn from both displayed cultures, and all influences experienced in the so-
cialization phase are non–vanishing. Specifically, the ‘success–rates’ of the
different displayed cultures in the cultural value–formation process of the
child depend on a) how much time both persons have spent demonstrating
their role–model to the child, and b) how much effort the persons invested
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during that time in convincing the child about the appropriateness of their
specific ‘world–view’. In our example, (except for degenerate cases) the child
will effectively be socialized to an intermediate stance with respect to the
cultural value under scrutiny, i.e. will take on in its own (true) cultural
specification a convex combination of the (numerical) values that the two
persons socializing it represented. The logic of this form of ‘formation of
values’ in the socialization process is easily extended to a framework with
multiple socializing persons, and multiple cultural values — the latter case
of which we will refer to as the before–mentioned ‘formation of culture’.
Parents have special interest in actively engaging in the socialization
process of their children. In the present paper, we will assume that par-
ents experience a level of dis–utility that positively depends on the cultural
distance between their (the parents’) own culture and the culture that the
children will have adopted after completion of the socialization process. One
justification for this assumption centers around the concept of ‘imperfect
empathy’, as used by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and throughout the
literature on cultural transmission of preferences. Parents are altruistic and
want to maximize the utility that their children generate out of their future
social and economic actions. Nevertheless, parents can evaluate this utility
only through the filter of their own culture and thus are biased towards
favoring their own cultural specification. An alternative justification for en-
dowing parents with a ‘preference for cultural closeness’ to their children is
to argue that parents try to avoid frictions in social interactions within the
family (under the assumption that those frictions increase in the cultural
distance of two persons). Hence, this justification does not necessitate the
assumption of altruism.
Given a certain expected distribution of displayed cultures in the pop-
ulation, the parental incentives to engage in the socialization process are
increasing in the distance between the displayed culture of any person or
group and the parents’ own culture. This stems from the fact that the chil-
dren’s social interaction with culturally more ‘alienate’ individuals will pull
their cultural outcome further away from the parents’ one.
To countervail the negative influences exerted by ‘alienate’ displayed
cultures, parents can employ their socialization technique. In this respect,
we apply here an adoption of the ‘direct vertical’ and ‘oblique’ transmission
framework that has been introduced into the economics literature by Bisin
and Verdier (2000, 2001) and is a standard application in the literature on
cultural transmission of preferences4. In the present paper, parents have
4The terminology of ‘direct vertical’ and ‘oblique’ transmission originates from Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), who also distinguish the latter
two cultural transmission channels from ‘horizontal’ transmission, i.e. social learning from
other children or peers (which we do not consider in the present paper). As Bisin and
Verdier (1998) point out, basing the socialization process on these cultural transmission
sources is consistent with results in the sociological literature.
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a controlling function over the cultural development of the child. They
can demonstrate to their children a role–model (displayed culture) and take
additional actions such as to decrease the cultural influence of deviating
role–models (that are represented by the general social environment) on the
culture of their child. These additional actions concern the time and effort
that parents take to convince the child about the superiority of their own
world–view compared to the world–views that the child is confronted with
in the general society. However, both a deviation from the cultural behavior
that would maximize the parents’ own utility, as well as the investments into
socialization time and effort are costly, which together with the desire for
inter–generational cultural closeness constitutes the parental socialization
problem.
The central question that this paper addresses concerns the characteris-
tics of the endogenous evolution of the cultural distance between two cultural
groups in a dynamic overlapping generations setting. In the present frame-
work, since parents are free to select the optimal displayed culture that they
want to transmit to their children, they typically choose to behave more
‘radical’ relative to the culture of the other group. In other words, the op-
timal displayed culture features a larger cultural distance to the (displayed
and true) culture of the other group, than the true culture of the parents
does, and the parents behaviorally dissimilate. This comes in an attempt
to countervail the ‘cultural pulling’ force that the other cultural group ex-
erts on their children. Still, the remaining question then is whether this
behavioral dissimilation is adjoined by sufficiently intense parental invest-
ments into their socialization success such as that the distance between the
final cultures of children of both groups will increase compared to that of
members of the parental generations (a cultural dissimilation).
A central result of this paper is that under the inter–generational cul-
tural closeness socialization motivation, such an outcome can never realize
and the cultural distances strictly decline over generations (cultural assimi-
lation). Even, the cultures of both group converge to a homogeneous culture,
which is a steady state of the cultural system. This steady state culture can
be interpreted as a mixture of the two original cultures, a result of which
corresponds to the ‘melting pot’ theory of integration of cultural groups.
Furthermore, the assimilative process (that is described by cultural con-
vergence) of any cultural group is slower the more intense the desire for
inter–generational cultural closeness is. This theoretical result might deliver
an explanation for the empirical observation of different successes in the in-
tegration process of cultural groups, notably the before mentioned lack of
integration of members of the Muslim culture into western societies. Sim-
ilarly, given the population shares of the cultural groups, cultural groups
with a more intense desire for inter–generational cultural closeness are rel-
atively more successful in the socialization process. This also implies that
the homogeneous steady state culture will be relatively closer to the initial
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culture of that cultural group. .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the concept of ‘formation of culture’, which is the adopted version of the
cultural transmission of preferences framework, that this paper proposes.
Section 3 analyses the properties of the cultural system when culture is
reduced to just one endogenous cultural value and when parents have a
desire for inter–generational cultural closeness. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Note that this working paper does not include the proofs of the Propositions.
A separate Appendix with all proofs can be obtained from the author upon
request.
2 Culture Formation
2.1 Culture and Cultural Behavior
The central objects of this paper are the concepts of culture and cultural
behavior. The culture of a person is defined as the set of values and attitudes
that determine the world–view of that person. Cultural values define the
valuations that a person (after the completion of the socialization process)
assigns to different aspects of life, e.g. the importance of family, friendship,
career, or the signaling of status. A cultural attitude defines the world–view
on socio–economic or political issues, like how much a person is in favor of
equal treatment of women, integration of minority groups or an egalitarian
society. The common characteristic of both cultural values and attitudes
is that their magnitude can be (subjectively) related to an ordinal scale5.
Consider a society that is populated by a set of adults, A, consisting of at
least two members6. Suppose that any adult has n different cultural values
and attitudes. Then, we will represent any of the cultural values7 of a person
l ∈ A by φi,l ∈ Ωi,l, i = 1, . . . , n, where Ωi,l :=
[
φ
i,l
, φi,l
]
⊆ R represents
the ordinal scale of the person (which we assume to be closed). The (self–
perceived) culture of person l is then defined as the n–dimensional vector
Φl := (φ1,l, . . . , φn,l)′ ∈ Ωl, with Ωl := ×ni=1Ωi,l ⊆ Rn.
Closely related to the ordinal scaling of cultural values is also the as-
sumption that individuals can choose and identify a behavior with respect
to different cultural values. The socio–economic actions that a person takes
(which also includes the direct communication of cultural values or atti-
5‘How important is family to you on a scale from 0 to 10?’, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10,
where 0 means ‘not at all’ and 10 means ‘totally in favor’, what is your attitude towards
the equal treatment of women in our society?’.
6A further specification of the population size will not be needed before the introduction
of the model framework in section 3.
7Subsequently, we will by default only refer to (cultural) values and will no longer
mention (cultural) attitudes for brevity. Nevertheless, all representations and results do
equally apply for the concept of attitudes.
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tudes) always imply the revelation of a life–style, which in the present
context exactly corresponds to the display of a culture. We assume that
any individual knows which socio–economic actions it has to take in order
to demonstrate a certain life–style or culture (according to its subjective
assessment). We will represent the displayed values of a person l ∈ A as
φdi,l ∈ Ωi,l, i = 1, . . . , n and the corresponding cultural behavior or displayed
culture as the n–dimensional vector Φdl := (φ
d
1,l, . . . , φ
d
n,l)
′ ∈ Ωl. Given that
individuals can establish a relationship between socio–economic actions and
displayed cultures, this also means that upon observing the socio–economic
actions of another person, an individual can relate them to the cultural
values that the actions represent and hence to its subjective ordinal scal-
ing (‘This person behaves as if family would be very important to it.’)8.
But the use of the term ‘subjective’ already points to the fact that in gen-
eral, the subjective ordinal scalings of two persons will not coincide. To
guarantee a meaningful analysis of the dynamical evolution of endogenous
cultural distance in later sections, the following assumption of interpersonal
comparability will be useful.
Assumption 1 (Interpersonal Comparability). For any two persons l,m ∈
A, who set own cultural behavior and observe the cultural behavior of the
other, we have that ∀i = 1, . . . , n φdi,l/φdi,hl = φdi,lh/φdi,h, with φdi,l, φdi,hl ∈ Ωl,
and φdi,lh, φ
d
i,h ∈ Ωh, and where the subscript vw denotes the assessment of
the displayed culture of person v by (the ordinal scale of) person w, and
where we define φdi,v := φ
d
i,vv, v, w ∈ {l, h}.
This assumption means that (subjective) absolute scalings may differ,
but the relative scalings are equal across individuals. The next assumption
establishes cardinal meaning for (the numerical values assigned to) cultural
values. It will be essential for the representation of ‘culture formation’ in
the following two sections.
Assumption 2 (Cardinality). If any person l ∈ A identifies with two differ-
ent sets of socio–economic actions x ∈ X and x′ ∈ X the displayed cultures
Φdl := (φ
d
1,l, . . . , φ
d
n,l)
′ ∈ Ωl and Φd′l := (φd
′
1,l, . . . , φ
d′
n,l)
′ ∈ Ωl, we have that
∀i = 1, . . . , n the first cultural behavior represents a φdi,l/φd
′
i,l times as high
valuation of cultural value i than the second cultural behavior.
The cardinality assumption states that any individual can compare dif-
ferent sets of (own and observed) socio–economic actions in terms of the
8What stands behind the formulation of choice and identification of cultural behavior is
the assumption that any set of actions in the socio–economic choice set, x ∈ X, represents
the demonstration of a unique culture Φl ∈ Ωl (as perceived by person l). Also, for any
culture Φl ∈ Ωl, person l knows which unique set of socio–economic choices, x ∈ X, it
has to choose to display it. This means that we have a bijective mapping X −→ Ωl and
we can directly identify any possible set of socio–economic actions as a displayed culture
Φdl ∈ Ωl, and vice verso.
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relative intensities for all displayed cultural values. Assumption 1 further
assures that the relative assessments by all individuals coincide9. By as-
sumptions 1 and 2, we can subsequently, without further loss of general-
ity, consider a normalized space of possible (true) and displayed cultures,
Ω := (Ω1, . . . ,Ωn) ⊆ Rn, which is equal for all individuals. We are now also
ready to define the cultural distance between the cultures of two persons,
as well as the displayed cultural distance between the displayed cultures of
the persons as the respective Euclidean distances. Consider two persons
l ∈ A and h ∈ A. Then, their cultural distance and displayed cultural dis-
tance are defined as ∆Φlh := ‖Φl,Φh‖, respectively ∆Φ
d
lh :=
∥∥Φdl ,Φdh∥∥, with
Φv,Φdv ∈ Ω, v = l, h.
2.2 Formation of Culture in a Nutshell
This section introduces the basic representation of the psychological pro-
cesses that lead to the formation of specific cultural values (and with them
a specific culture) in the socialization of a child. As in Bisin and Verdier
(2000, 2001), we assume that children are born without a predefined culture.
Culture is the final outcome of a process of social learning from, and the
adoption of, role–models that the children are confronted with in their social
environment. Different to Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), we do not assume
that one, and only one, of the different role–models succeeds in the social-
ization process and the child exactly adopts the respective culture. This
assumption would imply that all socialization influences from other persons
or role–models fully vanish after the socialization process has been com-
pleted. But this stands in stark contrast to standard results in the research
of child psychology and sociology. Although there is yet no uniformly agreed
on single theory of the formation of a child’s personality (hence the culture
of a person in our context), the literature agrees on the fact that the forma-
tion of personality is the collective outcome of all socialization influences.
We present here a formal approach to the formation of cultural values that
accounts for all socialization influences and hence is coherent with the latter
result10.
The basic intuition of this approach shall be explained by means of an
example. Suppose that the social environment of a child consists of just
two persons. This then means that the child is confronted with two (as-
sumingly) different role–models, or displayed cultures. The two role–models
9The cardinality assumption might appear strong. Nevertheless, the use of cardinal
values or attitudes is very common in economics, especially in the formulation of utility
functions, e.g. the time preference rate, leisure/consumption weights, weights on status
through education, consumption or wealth in the status literature, etc..
10The analysis in this paper is restricted to the socialization influences that the human
members of the society exert on a child. However, the logic of the socialization process
that we present here could equally be applied to the socialization influence of the society’s
institutions, like the legal and educational system or the media and marketing sector.
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then represent two competing world–views with respect to the underlying
displayed cultural values. Suppose that one person displays through its
socio–economic actions (and communications) a very high valuation of fam-
ily, while the contrary holds for the other person. Then the child socially
learns both to value family very high, and to value it very low. The central
assumption that we take now is that both role–models are mutually me-
diating as far as the world–view, i.e. culture, that the child will adopt is
concerned. This means that the child will be socialized to an intermediate
stance with respect to family values. Whether the child’s family value will
be closer to either the very high valuation of the one person, or to the very
low valuation of the other, depends on how much time the persons spent
with the child and how much effort (especially in a psychological sense) dur-
ing that time they put into convincing it that their respective world–view is
appropriate.
Let us now consider the formation of culture in the socialization process.
Suppose a child is ‘exposed’ to K (finite) different socialization sources, all
of which are characterized by a displayed culture11, Φdk := (φ
d
1,k, . . . , φ
d
n,k)
′ ∈
Ω, k = 1, . . . ,K. Then the culture (i.e. the set of cultural values) that
the child will adopt, Φc := (φ1,c, . . . , φn,c)′, realizes according to the time–
impact–weighted displayed culture of the finite set of socialization sources
Φc =
∑K
k=1 σkΦ
d
k∑K
k=1 σk
(1)
where σk := σ(τk, χk) denotes the socialization success of the specific so-
cialization source, which is a function of the time that the child has been
‘exposed’ to it, τk ∈ R+, and the credibility, χk ∈ R+, with which the respec-
tive world–view has been transmitted to the child. It is immediate to assume
that if a child has no contact to a person, the respective displayed culture
has no socialization influence, σ(0, χk) = 0, ∀χk ∈ R+, and also that the
socialization success can not be negative, σ(τk, χk) ∈ R+, ∀(τk, χk) ∈ R2+.
Furthermore, we assume that if a child merely observes the cultural behavior
of a person (and hence this person invests no specific physical and psychical
effort to socialize the child), this also yields social learning effects, and that
in this case, these effects are linear in the child’s pure observation time,
σ(τk, 0) = aτk, ∀τk ∈ R+, where a ∈ R++. Note finally that the repre-
sentation of the socialization process in equation (1) entails the assumption
that the influences of the socialization sources are exerted globally on the
culture of the child, i.e. there is no differentiated socialization success for
single cultural values.
11One single socialization source could thus concern a single person or a group of persons
(or any institution) that feature(s) a homogeneous displayed culture.
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2.3 Formation of Culture under Vertical and Oblique Trans-
mission
The last section introduced in a general way the approach to the formation
of values and culture that this paper proposes. The next step is to slightly
adopt the logic and apply it to an environment where children are socialized
through role–models displayed by their parents, and through role–models
of unrelated adults that constitute the society at large. These two distinct
socialization–channels have been introduced into the economics literature by
Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) as ‘direct vertical transmission’ and ‘oblique
transmission’.
Throughout the whole socialization process, where the child resides with
the parents, the parents have a controlling function over the development
of the child’s personality (culture). Not only do they directly participate
in the social learning process of their child through their displayed culture,
but they furthermore can permanently countervail (from their perspective)
negative cultural influences exerted by the social environment. This means
that during the time that parents spend with the child (which then also
corresponds to a distraction of the child from social interaction with other
members of the society), they can take effort to convince the child about
the superiority of the world–view that they propose via their displayed cul-
ture, compared to the world–views that the child is confronted with when
not with the parents. We will represent this special role of the parents in
the socialization process by an adopted version of the socialization success
function of section 2.2.
First, let us normalize the time–span that is constituted by the youth pe-
riod to one. Further, we assume that only the parents of a child have interest
in actively socializing it to a certain culture, while as the unrelated society at
large merely displays role–models (hence not adjoined by a specific psychical
or physical devotion to the child). According to the basic properties of the
socialization success function, it follows that the time–weighted socializa-
tion impact of the general social environment is given as σs := σ(1− τp, 0),
where τp ∈ [0, 1] denotes the time–share of the youth period that the par-
ents spend with the child. Hence, parents can control this time–weighted
‘oblique’ socialization impact by a choice of the ‘physical distraction’ of the
child from the general social environment. But then, through their addi-
tional choice of the credibility level that they can achieve with respect to
the role–model they propose, they can also govern their socialization success
rate, i.e. their share in the total time–weighted socialization impact on the
child in its youth period
σˆ(τp, χp) :=
σ(τp, χp)
σ(τp, χp) + σ(1− τp, 0)
Note that from the basic properties of the socialization success function it
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follows that σˆ(τp, χp) ∈ [0, 1], ∀(τp, χp) ∈ [0, 1]× R+.
With a choice of displayed culture and the socialization success rate,
parents can choose the location of the child’s final culture, subject to the
representative displayed culture of the general social environment. Let Φdp
denote the displayed culture that the parents of a child choose, and define
σˆp := σˆ(τp, χp). Further, let Φds denote the representative displayed culture
of the society at large (see below for its construction). Then the culture of
a child, Φc, is formed according to
Φc = Φdp + (1− σˆp)(Φds − Φdp) (2)
Equation (2) corresponds to the view that parents set a ‘cultural benchmark’
(Φdp), and invest into their socialization success rate (σˆp) to countervail the
influence of deviating displayed cultures (Φds) on the final culture of the
children.
Oblique transmission happens through the cultural interaction of the
child with the society at large on a public social space (e.g. schools and
leisure facilities)12. Assume that any generation consists of a continuum of
individuals. Each of these individuals belongs to one of G different cultural
groups and the population shares are denoted qg ∈ (0, 1), g = 1, . . . , G, such
that
∑G
g=1 qg = 1. The adults (parents) of each cultural group are culturally
homogeneous and make identical behavioral choices (see section 3), Φdg ∈ Ω.
Let us assume that the share (relative density) that the members of each
cultural group have on the public social space correspond to the population
shares of the cultural groups13 — and furthermore that these also coincide
with the relative social(ization) interaction times of each child with the
members of the cultural groups. Then, we obtain for the time–impact–
weighted displayed culture on the public social space (oblique transmission),
Φds , by the linearity of the socialization success function for the case of a
child’s mere observation of a role–model and equation (1)
Φds =
G∑
g=1
Φdgqg
Substituting this latter equation into equation (2), we end up at the
final representation of the formation of the culture of a child of any group
12It would be an interesting extension of the basic model, to endow parents with a con-
trolling function of the social composition of the people that their children interact with.
This could be e.g. in terms of neighborhood–, friends–, or school–selection. Thus, parents
would create (homogeneous) cultural clubs such as to avoid negative cultural influences
that are represented by the general social environment. Nevertheless, we refrain in this
paper from including this into the analysis, since it would only increase the dimension-
ality of the solution problem, without changing qualitatively the results for the cultural
dynamics.
13In the present model, we do not include a separate choice of distraction from the
public social space for the adults, which could alter the presence shares.
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l = 1, . . . , G in the socialization process14
Φcl = Φ
d
l + (1− σˆl)
 G∑
g=1
Φdgqg − Φdl
 (3)
Let us now specify the dynamic change in the cultures of a group from one
generation to the next. To make the representation more clear, let us here
and subsequently denote next period’s culture of a group (which is always
identified with the culture of its adults) with a tilde, i.e. Φ˜l ≡ Φcl .15 We
then obtain the cultural change over two succeeding generations of any group
l = 1, . . . , G as the vector of changes in the cultural values
Φ˙l := Φ˜l − Φl (4)
From equation (3), we can also derive the cultural distance between next
period’s adult cultures of two cultural groups l and h as
∆Φ˜lh :=
∥∥∥∥∥∥(σˆh − σˆl)
∑
g 6=l,h
Φdgqg + Φ
d
h (σˆh(1− qh) + σˆlqh)− Φdl (σˆl(1− ql) + σˆhql)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
and the dynamical change in the cultural distances between the two cultural
groups is then
∆˙Φlh := ∆
Φ˜
lh −∆Φlh (5)
Now that we have introduced the psychological processes by which the
culture of a child is formed, as well as the representations for the cultural
distance between two cultural groups and the dynamical cultural change
of a group over generations, we will present in the next section a model
framework that endogenously determines the parental socialization decisions
(displayed culture and socialization success rate), and hence the formation
of culture and the dynamics of cultural distances.
3 Endogenous Cultural Distance
This section introduces the model framework for analyzing the parental deci-
sion problem and the dynamics of the cultural distance between two cultural
groups, subject to the cultural formation mechanism as introduced in section
(2.3) above. Although it would be interesting to provide for an analysis of
endogenous cultural distance for a general n–dimensional culture, the scope
of the present paper is restricted to the analysis of only one endogenous
14Note that since all adult members of a cultural group display identical cultures, we
can use the group–index to represent the parental cultural behavior.
15Throughout the rest of the paper, we will distinguish contemporaneous state and
choice variables of adults of a cultural group from those of next period’s adults with a
tilde.
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cultural value. It is immediate that the advantage of this restriction is a
simplified solution procedure, which nevertheless comes at the cost of gener-
ality and of an incompatibility with respect to the representation of culture
(a point which will become clear below).
Consider a population consisting of overlapping generations, which live
for three life periods, but with the focus of the analysis concentrated on the
child/youth period and the adult (parent) period. Each generation consists
of a continuum of individuals. Reproduction is asexual and each adult has
one offspring, so that the overall population size has constant measure. We
define a cultural group as a collection of adults with the same culture and
let the culture of a person be represented by the single cultural value (thus,
we will subsequently drop the subscript for identifying a specific cultural
value). Initially (i.e. not in a homogeneous cultural steady state) the socio–
economy is populated by two distinct cultural groups indexed g ∈ {l, h}. For
this setting, it will also be convenient to define −g := {l, h}\g. In any given
period, any of the adults has either culture φh ∈ Ω := [φ, φ] ⊆ R or Φl ∈ Ω.16
We will require that in any equilibrium of a period, the adults of a cultural
group display identical culture, φdg ∈ Ω. In the present one–dimensional
setting, the cultural distance and displayed cultural distance between two
(members of) distinct cultural groups are denoted ∆φ := |φl − φh|, and
∆φ
d
:= |φdl − φdh| respectively.
As discussed before, the culture of a person determines its world–view.
According to this view, the culture of any person of cultural group g17 in-
duces a preference relation g defined over choices of displayed cultures
(‘life–styles’) φdg on Ω. We represent these preferences by a continuous util-
ity function uφg : Ω→ R, uφg(φdg). Besides the utility out of their choices of
life–style, parents of any cultural group g do also receive a utility component
that results out of the future culture, φ˜g, and/or socio–economic actions of
their children, φ˜dg. The source of this utility depends on which socialization
motivation structure we endow the parents with. This can both be of altru-
istic or of egoistic nature. We leave the specification of the the socialization
motives to section 4 and do at this point represent the inter–generational
utility of parents of cultural group g as a continuous function M φˆg(Ψg,Θg).
The superscript φˆg denotes the target for the culture or displayed culture
that the children should adopt subject to the specific socialization motiva-
tion, Ψg ⊆ {φ˜g, φ˜dg}, and Θg ∈ R+ denotes the intensity of the socialization
motivation. Within the logic of this paper, it is immediate that the latter
16We suppress here (and subsequently) the time–indices for sake of keeping the notation
more readable. Note also that the result that in each period any adult belongs to either of
the two cultural groups (outside a homogeneous cultural steady state) is an endogenous
model outcome, as long as there are two distinct cultural groups in the starting period.
17Note that all subsequent results are valid for all cultural groups g = l, h (unless
otherwise noted). We will nevertheless abstract from explicitly noting this fact at every
instance, to keep the text more readable.
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must be interpreted as a cultural value. Thus, we actually extend the set
of values that underly the culture of a person18. However, we restricted the
analysis of the present paper to just one endogenous cultural value. With
this representation, we then end up with two classes of cultural values: On
the one hand, the single endogenous cultural value that effectively induces
‘own’ adult utility out of socio–economic actions; and a fixed cultural value
that induces parental utility out of family considerations. Actually, thus,
we provide here only for an analysis of the endogenous distance in the ‘own
utility’ cultural value, subject to exogenously fixed inter–generational val-
ues. Nevertheless, we refrain from changing the terminology used so far, and
will continue to speak about the dynamics of ‘cultural distance’ or a ‘ho-
mogeneous cultural steady state’ — with the before mentioned qualification
kept in the back of our minds.
Abstracting from socialization costs, we obtain for the life–time utility
of an adult of cultural group g
uφg(φdg) +M
φˆg(Ψg,Θg)
In order to decide upon the optimal socio–economic choices (the dis-
played culture) and the investments into the socialization success rate, the
parents have to form expectations both about the final culture of their chil-
dren as well as about the resulting displayed culture that they will set. The
anticipation of the future culture of the child is based on the expectations of
the socio–economic choices of the members of both cultural groups. Adults
also have to form expectations about the cultural behavior of members of
the own group since we assume that although all adults know which cultural
group they belong to, and who are the other members of it, they are not
aware that their own choices will be eventually (i.e. in the equilibrium of
any period) identical to that of the other group members. Let us assume
for simplicity that all adults expect that all (other) members of a cultural
group will display an identical culture, and that the expectations are equal
for all adults. Denote these common expectations as φd,eg ∈ Ω. With this
latter assumption, we obtain for the expected future culture of a child of a
parent of any group g, φ˜eg
φ˜eg = φ
d
g + (1− σˆg)
(
φd,eg qg + φ
d,e
−g(1− qg)− φdg
)
(6)
Since parents can effectively choose the expected culture of their children by
a choice of the socialization instruments φdg and σˆg (given their expectations
about the displayed cultures in the social environment), we will also refer to
the latter equation as the parental socialization technique.
18The complete representation of culture in the present context would be Φg :=
(φg,Θg)
′. Also then, the utility function that is induced by the culture of a person should
correctly be denoted as UΦg := uφg (φdg) +M
φˆg (Ψg,Θg).
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Given the future expected culture of their children, parents form a my-
opic anticipation of the corresponding optimal future displayed culture. Al-
though the life–time utility of the parents includes an inter–generational
component, they do not consider the behavior–changing impact of their chil-
dren’s socialization motivation19. Thus, parents believe that their children
will, unrestricted by inter–generational considerations, maximize as their
life–time utility the utility that they obtain through their socio–economic
choices. In this respect, it is sensible to make the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Utility Maximizer). The utility function uφg has a unique
maximizer
arg max
φdg∈Ω
uφg(φdg) = φg
Parents correctly assess the (own utility) preferences over socio–economic
behavior that results out of any potential future culture of their children,
φ˜eg ∈ Ω. By Assumption 3, this means that the parents expect the optimal
socio–economic choice of their children to be
φ˜d,eg = φ˜
e
g = arg max
φ˜dg∈Ω
uφ˜
e
g(φ˜dg)
Under this form of myopia the expected inter–generational utility of the
parents then depends only on the expected future culture of their children,
M φˆg(φ˜eg,Θg). The expected culture of the children is subject to the parental
socialization technique (6) via the choice of displayed culture and the social-
ization success rate. As already discussed above, the latter is a function
σˆg := σˆg(τg, χg) of the time spent with the child, τg ∈ R+, and the credibil-
ity of the parental role–model, χg ∈ R+. Investment in both components is
costly. When parents spend time with the child, they encounter opportunity
cost (e.g. in form of foregone labor–income which implies lower consump-
tion utility, or in the form of leisure utility). Investments in the parental
credibility imply effort–cost in form of the physical and psychological devo-
tion to the child which are necessary to convince the child of the advantages
of the parental way of life. We will assume also that the credibility of the
parental displayed culture depends negatively on the distance to the par-
ents’ true culture, |φg −φdg|. The motivation behind this assumption is that
the parents themselves will be less satisfied of their own life, as well as less
19A corresponding assumption is also taken by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). It
effectively implies that parents do not take into account the utility of the whole dynasty.
Given the assumption of this form of parental myopia, the before discussed effective
split of the culture of a person into a single endogenous cultural value and a fixed inter–
generational (set) of value(s), could be interpreted in such a way that the parents do only
consider the own utility value as the basis for cultural assessments, and hence for their
socialization decisions. Nevertheless, this form of parental myopic would still allow to also
include the inter–generational values into the endogenous socialization process — hence
this source of incompatibility is not resolved with the alternative interpretation.
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convincing, when they take on a life–style which they do not consider as
optimal. Actually, we then have a credibility–function χg := χ(eg, |φg−φdg|)
that depends on physical and psychological effort, eg ∈ R+, and the distance
of the displayed and true culture of the parents, |φg − φdg| ∈ [0, |Ω|], where
|Ω| := φ − φ. We will at this point refrain from an explicit introduction
of the direct cost function of a choice (τg, eg) ∈ [0, 1] × R+. Instead, we
will consider only the indirect cost function of a choice σˆg ∈ [0, 1] given
|φg − φdg| ∈ [0, |Ω|]. These indirect costs will be represented by a continuous
function C : [0, 1]× [0, |Ω|]→ R+, C(σˆg, |φg − φdg|).
We are now ready to introduce the optimization problem of any parent of
cultural group g ∈ {l, h}. Parents maximize their expected life–time utility
by choosing the optimal displayed culture and socialization success rate20,
subject to the socialization costs and their socialization technique (equation
(6))
max
φdg∈Ω,σˆg∈[0,1]
uφg(φdg) +M
φˆg(φ˜eg,Θg)− C(σˆg, |φg − φdg|) (7)
The following assumption ensures (together with previous assumptions) that
the solution to optimization problem (7) is well defined.
Assumption 4 (Compact Culture Set). The set Ω := [φ, φ] is bounded (and
closed), −∞ < φ < φ <∞.
Since the choice sets of displayed culture and the socialization success
rate are compact and all functions are continuous by assumption, it follows
from the Theorem of the Maximum that the set of maximizers of problem (7)
is non–empty, convex, compact and upper hemicontinuous. The optimiza-
tion problems of parents of both cultural groups have identical structure, so
that any of the solutions to problems (7) is a tuple(
φdl (φ
d,e
l , φ
d,e
l ), φ
d
h(φ
d,e
l , φ
d,e
h ), σˆl(φ
d,e
l , φ
d,e
h ), σˆh(φ
d,e
l , φ
d,e
h )
)
∈ Ω2 × [0, 1]2
We will require that in the equilibrium of any period, the believes about the
displayed cultures are consistent. This means that(
φdl (φ
d,e
l , φ
d,e
h ), φ
d
h(φ
d,e
l , φ
d,e
h )
)
=
(
φd,el , φ
d,e
h
)
(8)
in the equilibrium of any period. It then follows that all members of a
cultural group display identical culture (given our assumption that any adult
expected the displayed culture of all (other) members of a cultural group
20Let us also emphasize at this point that the fact that the parents can also choose very
low or even zero socialization success rates could be interpreted as non–according with
the special role of the parents in the growing up process of their children. This effectively
constitutes a minimal time– and effort–level that the parents invest into the socialization
of their children. It would be an interesting extension of the present model to analyze the
effects of including such a lower bound for the socialization success rate into the model.
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to be identical). The left–hand side of the equation above is an upper
hemicontinuous, convex– and compact–valued mapping from a compact and
convex set into itself, Ω2 → Ω2. By Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, a
fixed point (8) exists and the consistent believes equilibrium concept that
we apply here is well defined. Subsequently, we will denote a consistent
believes equilibrium of a period as the tuple (φd
∗
l , φ
d∗
h , σˆ
∗
l , σˆ
∗
h) ∈ Ω2 × [0, 1]2.
We will refer to the latter also as a ‘temporary equilibrium’.
The following is a list of additional assumptions that is needed for the
characterization of a temporary equilibrium under consistent believes.
Assumption 5 (Slope).
(a) The utility function uφg is C1, quasi–concave and has zero slope only at
the point φdg = φg.
21
(b) The socialization motivation function M φˆg : Ω× R+ → R is C1, quasi–
concave, and ∂M
φˆg (φ˜eg ,Θg)
∂ φ˜eg
= 0 only at the point φ˜eg = φˆg (for Θg ∈ R++).
(c) The map C is C1, strictly increasing and quasi–convex in the first argu-
ment, and increasing and quasi–convex in the second argument. More-
over, ∂C(σˆg ,0)
∂|φg−φdg | = 0, ∀σˆg ∈ [0, 1], and
∂C(0,|φg−φdg |)
∂σˆg
= 0, ∀|φg − φdg| ∈
[0, |Ω|].
Assumption 5 (b) states that parents receive maximal inter–generational
utility if they expect their children to adopt exactly the cultural target φˆg
(and display this culture by the parental myopia), and that the expected
utility is strictly decreasing on both sides of the target.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of a Temporary Equilibrium). Let As-
sumption 5 be satisfied. Then, if φˆh ≥ φh > φl ≥ φˆl,22 the following prop-
erties are satisfied in a temporary equilibrium under the consistent believes
condition23
(a) σˆ∗g ∈ (0, 1], ∀ g = l, h
(b) φd
∗
h ≥ φh > φl ≥ φd
∗
l (with equalities iff φh = φ or φl = φ)
21Note also that Assumption 5 (a) implies Assumption 3.
22We consider here the case where the cultures are non–homogeneous, φl 6= φh. Thus, we
can without loss of generality assume that φh > φl. We will consider the characterization
of a temporary equilibrium under homogeneous cultures (which can then also be a steady
state) when we specify the socialization motivation in section 4. Also note that the
restriction φˆh ≥ φh > φl ≥ φˆl holds endogenously for the case of non–homogeneous
cultures as long as φh0 > φl0 for the inter–generational cultural closeness socialization
motivation.
23For the results (a) and (b) to hold, we need the additional assumption that Θg ∈
R++, ∀g = l, h. Otherwise, if Θg = 0, we would trivially have the result that σˆ∗g = 0 and
φd
∗
g = φg, since the parents have no socialization motivation.
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(c) φˆh > φ˜∗h > φ˜
∗
l > φˆl
By the results of Proposition 1 it follows that in any temporary equi-
librium, parents of both groups will dissimilate behaviorally (except for the
boundary case), which implies φd
∗
h − φd
∗
l =: ∆
φd
∗
> ∆φ. This comes in
attempt to countervail the negative cultural influence that the other cul-
tural group exerts on the child on the public social space. Of course, such
a deviation from the parents’ optimal (own utility) socio–economic choice
(φdg = φg) must be accompanied with strictly positive investments into the
socialization success rate. Since parents do not perceive inter–generational
utility loss for marginal deviations from the socialization target cultures, the
future cultures of the children of both cultural groups will lie strictly in the
interior of the cultural space that is formed by the target cultures. Further-
more, the relative position of the cultures of the two groups (in terms of
a lower or higher endogenous cultural value) is preserved over generations.
This is a result of the strictly positive socialization success rate that the
parents choose to guarantee that the final culture of their children is closer
to the target culture than the representative displayed culture of the general
social environment is.
Under the following list of assumptions, the behavior of the cultural
system can be further specified.
Assumption 6 (Curvature).
(a) The maps uφg , M φˆg and −C are C2 and concave.
(b) The optimization problem 7 is strictly concave, i.e. at least one of the
maps M φˆg and −C is strictly concave.
(c) The marginal cost of a deviation of the future expected (displayed) culture
of the children from the target culture is increasing in the socialization
motivation intensity, sign(φˆg − φ˜eg)∂
2M φˆg (φ˜eg ,Θg)
∂ φ˜eg ∂Θg
≥ 0.
(d) At any temporary equilibrium the two socialization instruments are com-
plements in the socialization problem of the parents, i.e. for g = l/h
∂2M φˆg (φ˜g ,Θg)
∂ φ˜eg
2
∂ φ˜g
∂ φdg
∂ φ˜g
σˆg
+ ∂M
φˆg (φ˜g ,Θg)
∂ φ˜eg
+ sign(φg − φdg)∂
2 C(σˆg ,|φg−φdg |)
∂ |φg−φdg | ∂ σˆg
≤ / ≥ 0
Note that Assumption 6 (d) is sufficient but not necessary for the results of
the following Proposition 2 to hold. The point that the results would also
hold if the two socialization instruments are not too strong substitutes is
developed in the proof of the Proposition.
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Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics). Let Assumptions 5 and 6 be satisfied.
Then, in any temporary equilibrium, the following comparative statics results
hold (the entries correspond to g = l/h)
sign
 ∂ φd∗g∂Θg ∂ φd∗g∂ qg ∂ φd∗g∂ φd−g ∂ φd∗g∂ φg
∂ σˆ∗g
∂Θg
∂ σˆ∗g
∂ qg
∂ σˆ∗g
∂ φˆg
∂ σˆ∗g
∂ φg

=( −/+ +/− −/− +/+
+/+ −/− +/− −/+
)
If parents aim at moving the (expected) final culture of their children
in a certain direction relative to the displayed culture of the other cultural
group, a weak complementarity of the two socialization instruments in the
socialization problem (Assumption 6 (d)) is sufficient to ensure that the
parents will employ the two instruments in a symmetric way. This means
that an increase (decrease) of the parents’ displayed culture relative to the
displayed culture of the other group will be adjoined by an increase (de-
crease) of the socialization success rate. If the complementarity assumption
(together with the other Assumptions 6) is fulfilled, then, first, if a cultural
group has a stronger socialization motivation, its parents will invest more
into their socialization instruments to guarantee that the future (expected)
displayed culture of their children is closer to the socialization target culture.
Second, the investments in the socialization instruments are decreasing in
the population share of the own cultural group. This comes from the fact
that in any temporary equilibrium, all parents of a cultural group display
identical behavior. Hence, the parents can use the more favorable cultural
composition of the public social space as a substitute for their own socializa-
tion investments. Third, if the target culture for the socialization decision of
the parents increases relative to the displayed culture of the other cultural
group, the latter constitutes a more negative cultural influence which induces
the parents to increase both of their socialization instruments. Finally, for
a larger distance between the own culture of the parents and the displayed
culture of the members of the other cultural group, parents increase their
investments into the socialization instruments to countervail the more neg-
ative ‘cultural pulling force’ on the final culture of their children. Since this
holds for both cultural groups, we also have that the displayed cultural dis-
tance as well as the socialization success rates are increasing in the (true)
cultural distance, ∂∆
φd
∗
∂∆φ
> 0, ∂ σˆ
∗
g
∂∆φ
> 0, g = l, h.
The following section considers the behavior of the model presented so far
under an inter–generational cultural closeness related socialization motiva-
tion. The analysis is extended to provide for a characterization of a tem-
porary equilibrium when the system features homogeneous cultures, as well
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as it derives properties of the dynamics of the endogenous cultural distance,
and a result that shows that minorities invest more into the socialization
instruments under certain conditions.
4 Inter–generational Cultural Closeness
It is an undisputed fact that family is one of the most central aspects in
human life. This section introduces a class of socialization motives that is
based on intra–family considerations of the parents. Specifically, this class
represents a desire of the parents for the future culture of their children to
be close to their own culture — which hence serves as the target culture
in the socialization process. Subsequently, we will shortly introduce three
justifications for this assumption.
The first justification is based on a special form of parental altruism
called ‘imperfect empathy’. This concept has been introduced into the eco-
nomics literature by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). Parents are altruistic to
their children and want to maximize the utility out of the children’s future
socio–economic choices, based on the expectations of their culture. Never-
theless, parents can assess this utility only through the filter of their own
preferences (culture), which in the present framework introduces a desire
for cultural closeness, since the parents are myopic and expect their chil-
dren to choose a life–style that accords to their culture (Assumption 3). A
second interpretation of family related values is what we call ‘family cohe-
sion’. This concept is based on social interactions within the family, thus
on the displayed cultures of the generations. If the displayed cultures of
parents (in their third life–period) and children (in their adult–period) are
more distant, then this causes more frictions, misunderstandings and (mu-
tual) disappointment. Under the parental myopia, the expected displayed
culture of the children coincides with their (true) culture. Furthermore, we
assume that also the grand–parental displayed culture will equal their true
culture, φdg = φg (we abstract here from introducing a separate notation for
the grand–parental choices), since in the third life–period, they have no more
need to engage in socialization, and thus can unrestrictedly maximize their
utility out of socio–economic choices. This then justifies the assumption of
the parental desire for inter–generational cultural closeness. The third, and
purely philosophical, interpretation is based on the assumption that parents
simply have an intrinsic desire for their children to develop a personality,
hence culture, that is similar to their own one (e.g. if they view the life of
their children as a continuation of their own life).
Given these motivations for a desire for inter–generational cultural close-
ness, we have that φˆg ≡ φg and we will represent the socialization motivation
function as Mφg(φ˜eg, βˆg). In the present case, βˆg is a composed value out
of the usual time–discount rate (since the relevant socio–economic actions
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of the children take place one period after the parents take the socializa-
tion actions), and a value that represents the strength of the parental desire
for inter–generational cultural closeness24. It follows that under the inter–
generational cultural closeness related class of socialization motivation, the
parental optimization problem (7) is
max
φdg∈Ω,σˆg∈[0,1]
uφg(φdg) +M
φg(φ˜eg, βˆg)− C(σˆg, |φg − φdg|) (9)
subject to the parental socialization technique (6). Let φl0 , φh0 denote the
starting cultures of the two cultural groups. Then, the cultural system
satisfies the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (Characterization of a Temporary Equilibrium). Let As-
sumption 5 be satisfied. Then if φh0 > φl0, the following properties are
satisfied in any temporary equilibrium
1. Case φh > φl (outside homogeneous cultural steady state)
(a) σˆ∗g ∈ (0, 1), ∀g = l, h
(b) φd
∗
h ≥ φh > φ˜∗h > φ˜∗l > φl ≥ φd
∗
l , with equalities iff φh = φ or φl = φ
2. Case φh = φl (homogeneous cultural steady state)
(a) σˆ∗g = 0, ∀g = l, h
(b) φd
∗
h = φh = φ˜
∗
h = φ˜
∗
l = φl = φ
d∗
l
Compared to the general results of Proposition 1, in case of the inter–
generational cultural closeness socialization motivation, where the socializa-
tion target coincides with the culture of the parents, they would never choose
a combination of socio–economic actions and socialization success rate such
that their children adopt exactly the parental culture (φ˜g = φg). This comes
from the fact that if the future culture of the children only marginally de-
viates from the parents’ culture, this is not perceived as costly. As a result,
the final cultures of the children of both cultural groups lie in the interior of
24In the case of imperfect empathy, it is immediate to specify Mφg (φ˜eg, βˆg) := βˆgu
φg (φ˜eg),
with βˆg := βgαg and where βg ∈ R++ represents the usual time–discount rate and αg ∈
R++ denotes the ‘degree of parental altruism’ (i.e. the relative valuation that parents put
on own utility versus the future utility of the children; altruism literature reference here).
The formulations in the literature on cultural transmission of preferences, notably Bisin
and Verdier (2000, 2001), correspond to the special case βgαg = 1.
Given imperfect empathy, the expected utility loss that parents perceive if their children
do not exactly adopt the parental culture is then V φg (φ˜eg) := αg(u
φg (φg) − uφg (φ˜eg)).
Compared to Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), this formulation has the advantage, that
it does not have to be interpreted as an exogenous degree of cultural intolerance of the
parents, but is endogenous within the present model framework (but subject to the still
exogenous degree of parental altruism).
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the interval that is constituted by the cultures of the parental generation,
φ˜g ∈ (φl, φh). This then implies that over generations, the cultural groups
assimilate (but not completely) 0 < φ˜h − φ˜l := ∆φ˜ < ∆φ, i.e. for any two
succeeding periods ∆˙φ < 0 (equation 5). Asymptotically, thus, the cultural
system converges to a homogeneous culture, φh = φl, and parents have no
more need to engage into active socialization, so that this homogeneous cul-
ture is also a rest point. While as the exact location of the homogeneous
steady state depends on the initial location of the cultures (and the social-
ization motivation intensities), the corresponding cultural distance of zero
in a homogeneous steady state is globally asymptotically stable.
This result will be stated more formally in a Corollary. First, consider the
present overlapping generations model in the continuous time limit25. Let
the paths of cultures that evolve out of the parental problems (9) under the
condition for a temporary equilibrium be denoted φh(t, φh0) and φl(t, φl0),
where t is the time–index. The corresponding path for the endogenous
cultural distance is denoted ∆φ(t,∆φ0 ) := φh(t, φh0)− φl(t, φl0).
Corollary 1 (Dynamics of Cultural Distance). If Assumption 5 is fulfilled,
then limt→∞∆φ(t,∆
φ
0 ) = 0, ∀φh0 − φl0 =: ∆φ0 ∈ [0, |Ω|]. Moreover, ∀g ∈
{l, h}, limt→∞ φg(t, φg0) = φ∗ ∈ (φl0 , φh0).
Proof. By Proposition 3, 1.(b), the dynamics of the cultural distance is a
contraction mapping and the system converges to a homogeneous cultural
steady state for any initial cultural distance. By Proposition 3, 2., any
homogeneous cultural steady state is a rest point.
Corollary 1 states that under the inter–generational cultural closeness
related socialization motivation, the cultural system converges to an inte-
rior homogeneous steady state. The social(ization) interactions of the two
cultural groups induce a dynamic cultural assimilation process, which re-
sults in the creation of a new equilibrium culture that can be interpreted as
a mixture of the two initial cultures. This theoretical result corresponds to
the ‘melting pot’ theory of cultural assimilation (see Han (2006), p. 32).
Assumption 7 (Symmetry). The maps uφg and Mφg are symmetric, i.e.
∀φdv, φd
′
w ∈ Ω s.t. |φv − φdv| = |φw − φd
′
w |, it holds that |uφv(φv)− uφv(φdv)| =
|uφw(φw)− uφw(φd′w )|, and ∀βˆv = βˆw ∈ R+, ∀φ˜d,ev , φ˜d,e
′
w ∈ Ω s.t. |φv − φ˜d,ev | =
|φw − φ˜d,e
′
w |, it holds that |Mφv(φv, βˆv) −Mφv(φ˜d,ev , βˆv)| = |Mφw(φw, βˆw) −
Mφw(φ˜d,e
′
w , βˆw)|, v, w ∈ {l, h}.
Assumption 7 states that parents evaluate losses out of own utility and
utility losses out of the inter–generational cultural closeness motivation only
25We take the derivation of the continuous time limit from Bisin and Verdier (2001).
Consider an OLG economy where the agents live ∆ units of time and have children 1− h
units of time after birth. We get the continuous time limit by taking the limit for ∆, h→ 0
with h
∆
→ 0.
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with respect to the absolute distance from the utility optimum, i.e. they are
indifferent if the deviation concerns lower or higher than optimal (displayed
and future expected) cultural values. Furthermore, for equal deviations from
the utility optimum, given equal values for the inter–generational cultural
closeness desire, the evaluation of the implied utility loss equals across indi-
viduals (and cultures). Under this additional condition, the following result
holds.
Proposition 4 (Relative Socialization Investments). Let Assumptions 6—7
be satisfied. Then ∀qg < q−g, ∃ β(qg, βˆ−g,∆φ) ∈ (0, βˆ−g) such that ∀ βˆg ≥
β(qg, βˆ−g,∆φ) it holds that |φg − φd∗g | > |φ−g − φd
∗
−g| and σˆ∗g > σˆ∗−g.
Compared to the majority cultural group, the members of the minor-
ity face a more unfavorable cultural composition of the public social space.
This implies that they have more incentives than the members of the ma-
jority to countervail the cultural impact of the public social space on the
(expected) culture of the future adult generation, and that they invest more
into the socialization instruments. This effect can, in a certain range, even be
dominating if the minority cultural group features a lower value for inter–
generational cultural closeness (and/or is less patient) than the majority
does.
Figure 1: Dynamics of the Cultural System (Symmetric Cases)
To close the analysis of the cultural system under the inter–generational
cultural closeness socialization motivation, we illustrate the analytical re-
sults by means of a numerical simulation26. Figure 1 shows the dynamics
26For the numerical simulation, we used the following specifications: uφg (φdg) = −|φg −
φdg|2, Mφg (φ˜eg, βˆg) = −βˆg|φg−φ˜eg|2, C(σˆg, |φg−φdg|) = σˆ2g
(
1 + |φg − φdg|2
)
. It is immediate
that these functions satisfy all relevant Assumptions of this section. Furthermore, we used
an initial cultural distance of 30 units, and the total length of the time–axis in all graphs
corresponds to 100 periods. Nevertheless, the choice of the initial cultural distance and
the resulting length of the convergence path could be arbitrarily changed, so that they are
not indicated in the graphs.
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of the cultural system for two symmetric cases. In the upper graph of each
case, the solid lines represent the displayed culture of the groups and the
dotted lines represent the (true) culture of the groups (and the dash–dotted
line locates the population–share weighted convex combination of the ini-
tial cultures; this would equate to the cultural steady state if parents of
both cultural groups would not invest into the socialization instruments).
In both pair of graphs of the Figure, one can see that since the optimiza-
tion problems of parents of both cultural are fully symmetric (and strictly
concave), they choose identical investments in the socialization instruments,
i.e. both the choices of the distance of displayed and (true) culture as well
as of the socialization success rate are equal. Moreover, the investments in
both socialization instruments are strictly decreasing along the transitory
path (since it features a strictly declining cultural distance). This implies
that the cultural system converges to a homogeneous steady state that is
located exactly at the population–share weighted convex combination of the
two initial cultures, i.e. in the middle of the two initial cultures in the
present cases. Compared to the left pair of graphs, the right case features
a higher value for the inter–generational cultural closeness for both cultural
groups. This higher socialization incentive results in higher investments in
the socialization instruments for any given cultural distance, and the speed
of convergence is accordingly lower.
Figure 2: Dynamics of the Cultural System (Asymmetric Cases)
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the cultural system for two asym-
metric cases. In both cases, the ‘low value’ cultural group is the minority,
whose path of the socialization success rate is represented by the dotted
lines in the lower graph of each case. In the left pair of graphs, although
the value for inter–generational cultural closeness of the minority cultural
group is only half as high as the majority’s, the ‘minority effect’ (i.e. the
higher socialization incentives given the more unfavorable cultural composi-
tion of the public social space) is strong enough such that its parents invest
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more into both socialization instruments throughout the transitory path.
Moreover, although the share of the minority group is only one fifth of the
total population, the socialization investments of its parents succeed those
of the majority’s parents to a high enough extent for the cultural system
to converge to a steady state culture that is located in the interior of the
population–share weighted convex combination of the two initial cultures
and the initial culture of the minority.
These results do not hold for the other asymmetric case, which features
a larger population share of the minority, but an even lower relative value
for inter–generational cultural closeness. Although the ‘minority effect’ is
strong enough for the minority parents’ investments into their socialization
success rate to exceed those of the majority’s parents in initial periods (i.e.
where the cultural distance is relatively high), this result reverses in later
periods. Additionally, this weak domination of the minority cultural group
with respect to the socialization success rate is not adjoined by a dominance
in terms of a larger distance between the displayed and true culture in any
of the periods along the convergence path. As a result, the cultural system
converges to a steady state culture that is located in the interior of the
population–share weighted convex combination of the two initial cultures
and the initial culture of the majority.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a new approach to cultural transmission of preferences,
based on the work of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). The central innovation
that we introduce is that the assumption of the existing literature of inter–
temporarily fixed cultures of the cultural groups under scrutiny is replaced
with an endogeneization of the ‘formation of culture’. The endogeneization
is based on modeling the culture of a person as an n–dimensional set of
cultural values and attitudes, represented as tuples in Euclidean space. The
cultural distance between two persons is then defined as the respective Eu-
clidean distance between the two cultures. The formation of the culture of
a person realizes through social learning and imitation of role–models in the
youth period. We model role–models as ‘displayed cultures’ of the parents
(‘vertical transmission’) and the general social environment (i.e. the other
adults of the society; ‘oblique transmission’). If the displayed culture, i.e.
the life–style or role–model that an adult takes on, differs from the true cul-
ture of a person, then it encounters utility losses, since it pursues a life–style
that does not correspond to the subjectively perceived optimal one. Parents
are willing to encounter this utility loss, since they have a desire for the
(future) culture of their children to be close to the own culture. The justi-
fication for this assumption is that parents have either ‘imperfect empathy’
or want to avoid frictions within the family that result out of the differ-
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ing world–views of the generations. Parents can support the life–style that
they display to their children by investing into their socialization success
rate. This involves additional socialization costs in terms of time and effort.
The parental optimization problem is then to choose the optimal displayed
culture and investments into their socialization success rate given their ex-
pectations of the displayed cultures of the general social environment.
The present paper analyzed the dynamics of the cultural distance be-
tween two cultural groups with one endogenous cultural value. The central
results are as follows. Parents always display a culture that is more distant
to the culture of the other cultural group, than their true culture is, com-
plemented with a strictly positive socialization success rate. Nevertheless,
the socialization investments of the parents are never strong enough such
as that the distance between the future cultures of the children of the two
groups is larger or equal than the cultural distance of the parental genera-
tion has been. This means that the cultural distance strictly declines over
generations and the cultures of both groups converge to a homogeneous
steady state culture that is located in the convex hull of the two original
cultures. This steady state culture can thus be interpreted as a mixture of
the two original cultures, which corresponds to the ‘melting pot’ theory of
integration of cultural groups.
We also showed that the assimilative process towards a homogeneous
equilibrium culture is slower the stronger the desire for inter–generational
cultural closeness is. Furthermore, if the two socialization instruments are
complements in the socialization problem of the parents, the socialization
investments are decreasing in the population share of the own cultural group,
which under certain conditions guarantees that parents of a minority cultural
group invest more into the socialization instruments than parents of the
majority do.
There are a number of directions, in which the present theoretical analy-
sis could be extended. First, it might be interesting to identify whether there
are different classes of socialization motivations under which non–decreasing
cultural distances, and a cultural equilibrium with strictly positive cultural
distance, are possible. Second, the behavior of the cultural system under
different classes of socialization motivations should also be analyzed in an
n–dimensional culture framework. Third, the empirical validity of the the-
oretical results should be investigated.
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